Warfare, Taxation, and Political Change: Evidence from the Italian Risorgimento by Dincecco, Mark et al.
  
887 
 
Warfare, Taxation, and Political Change: 
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 
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ANDREA VINDIGNI 
 
We examine the relationships between warfare, taxation, and political change  
in the context of the political unification of the Italian peninsula. Using  
a comprehensive new database, we argue that external and internal threat 
environments had significant implications for the demand for military strength, 
which in turn had important ramifications for fiscal policy and the likelihood of 
constitutional reform and related improvements in the provision of nonmilitary 
public services. Our analytic narrative complements recent theoretical and 
econometric works about state capacity. By emphasizing public finances, we 
also uncover novel insights about the forces underlying state formation in Italy. 
 
“The budget is the skeleton of the state, stripped of any misleading ideologies.” 
Sociologist Rudolf Goldscheid, 19261 
 
ublic finances are the sinews of state power. A growing theoretical 
literature examines the interplay between wars, fiscal policy, and 
economic development.2 This literature takes inspiration from historical 
works that investigate the relationship between external conflicts and 
fiscal innovations that enabled states to gather greater wartime funds.3 It 
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is also motivated by works in political science that study the state’s 
ability to raise tax revenues and provide growth-promoting public 
services.4 Taken as a whole, the new theoretical literature links the 
demands of war with fiscal and political improvements, and greater 
fiscal strength with superior public services and thus better economic 
outcomes. While the key advantage of the new theoretical literature is 
formal rigor, so far there are only partial empirical tests of it. 
 To help fill this gap, this article examines the fiscal evolution of 
Italian states from the end of the Napoleonic era in 1815 to political 
unification in 1861. Called the Risorgimento, the unification process 
was one of the major changes in the geopolitical landscape in 
nineteenth-century Europe. More generally, the institutional variety at 
the regional level makes pre-unitary Italy a unique testing ground for 
comparative work. Using a comprehensive new database, we argue that 
external and internal threat environments had significant implications 
for the demand for military might, which in turn had important 
ramifications for fiscal policy and the likelihood of constitutional 
reform and related improvements in the provision of nonmilitary public 
services. 
 By investigating the precise links between threat exigencies, military 
and fiscal decisions, and political change in a specific historical context, 
our analytic narrative provides a novel empirical counterpart to the 
burgeoning theoretical literature. Our case-oriented approach also 
complements recent econometric works that test for the broad economic 
and political effects of warfare and taxation across many countries and 
years.5 Finally, our focus on the fiscal features of pre-unitary states 
offers a new perspective on the forces underlying political unification 
on the Italian peninsula. Most recent works on the Risorgimento 
downplay fiscal factors, instead emphasizing cultural and social 
conditions and the development of a shared national identity.6 We  
do not deny the importance of non-fiscal features. However, Italian 
unification was at base the result of a set of successful wars. Our 
investigation shows how differences in pre-unitary fiscal policies 
shaped this outcome.7 
 
4 For Africa, see Migdal, Strong Societies; Herbst, States; and Bates, Prosperity. For East 
Asia, see Wade, Governing; and Kang, Crony Capitalism. 
5 See Besley and Persson, “Origins”; and Scheve and Stasavage, “Conscription.” 
6 See Hearder, Italy; Riall, Italian Risorgimento; and Banti, Nazione. Older works like Ciasca, 
L’origine, and Candeloro, Storia dell’Italia, consider economic factors. 
7 Here our work is related to Ziblatt, Structuring. Certainly the diverse fiscal features of pre-
unitary states influenced the choice of a centralized (versus federalist) political system in the 
unified Kingdom of Italy after 1861. See Riker, Federalism, for the military origins of state 
formation more generally. 
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 The article proceeds as follows. We first develop a simple analytic 
framework that interprets military and fiscal differences in the context 
of European history in terms of diverse political conditions, and in 
particular the magnitude of external and internal threats that absolutist 
rulers faced, along with their foreign ambitions. Our framework yields 
several implications about the relationships between threat exigencies 
and military strength, between military strength and fiscal policy,  
and between constitutional reform and the provision of nonmilitary 
public services. We next describe the domestic and foreign political 
contexts in which the Risorgimento took place and document the main 
events. Drawing on our new database, we then evaluate the implications 
of our framework with a detailed quantitative investigation of the 
Risorgimento, which we follow up with a simple regression analysis 
that exploits the panel nature of the data. Overall, our examination 
confirms the framework’s implications. We conclude by evaluating our 
findings with respect to the new theoretical literature. 
 
ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
 
 We claim that external and internal political environments determined 
the desired level of military strength, which then influenced fiscal policy. 
Depending on circumstances, fiscal imperatives induced constitutional 
reform and related investments in public services such as infrastructure. 
 In the first link in this chain, threat environments influenced the 
demand for military might. Philip Hoffman and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal 
argue that the one true goal of absolutist monarchs in European history 
was to wage war for personal glory and for homeland defense.8 We thus 
claim that decisions about military spending reflected most importantly 
assessments by rulers of opportunities for territorial expansion and 
threats of outside attack. The greater were these opportunities or threats, 
then the greater were military expenditures. The military also protected 
rulers from internal risks of overthrow. All states invested in secret 
police to uncover conspiracies, and the military was called in to repress 
popular revolts. 
 The second link was from military demands to fiscal policy. Military 
expenses including debt service to pay for past wars dominated state 
budgets in preindustrial Europe.9 States did not typically pursue industrial 
policies until the second half of the nineteenth century, and they spent 
little on social programs of any kind before the twentieth century.10 
 
8 “Political Economy.” 
9 Ibid. 
10 See Magnusson, Nation; and Lindert, Growing. 
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 Rulers had three basic options to gather revenues, which they 
implicitly ordered in terms of political expediency. The least likely to 
spark internal turmoil was to borrow funds on domestic and international 
bond markets. Borrowing opportunities were limited, however, because 
the creditworthiness of rulers ultimately depended on their ability to 
collect sufficient tax amounts. Large ratios of debt to taxes were bound to 
negatively affect the ability of sovereigns to borrow new funds.11 
 A sounder but more controversial option was to increase indirect 
taxes, starting with customs duties, which were less transparent than 
outright consumption taxes. Indirect taxes typically affected the 
population at large, who had no formal political voice but could always 
stage a revolt. Hence, rulers could only levy new indirect taxes up to  
a limit. Too drastic a rise in indirect taxation increased the risk of 
uprisings. This risk was larger, and thus the threshold for popular revolt 
smaller, if new tax funds were spent on warfare, since the masses 
provided the bulk of military recruits and took the greatest casualties 
while gaining no clear benefits from fighting. 
 A lucrative but particularly controversial option was to increase 
direct taxes, which typically affected powerful elites. The landowning 
aristocracy was an important part of the traditional order upon which 
the legitimacy of absolute monarchs rested. Furthermore, rulers required 
the expertise of elites to help manage state bureaucracies and to prevent 
or quell popular uprisings. Levying new direct taxes thus increased the 
risk that elites would support or even provoke popular revolts. Imposing 
direct taxes was also technically complex in terms of administration and 
enforcement. 
 The traditional aristocracy directly benefited from the rent-generating 
state jobs that the military offered. Merchant elites, by contrast, did not 
profit as such from military spending. These elites may have desired 
more public services, and in particular investments in transportation 
networks that would promote trade by reducing transaction costs. If  
so, then there was the impetus for the sort of parliamentary bargain 
characterized by Hoffman and Rosenthal and Mark Dincecco, whereby 
merchant elites agreed to pay higher direct taxes in exchange for greater 
spending on nonmilitary items such as infrastructure.12 
 To make this bargain (the third and fourth links in our chain) credible, 
it had to be enshrined in a liberal constitution that granted elites regular 
 
11 See Flandreau and Zumer, Making; and Ferguson and Schularick, “Empire Effect.” 
12 Hoffman and Rosenthal, “Divided”; and Dincecco, “Fiscal Centralization” and Political 
Transformations. Similarly, Acemoglu, “Institutions,” argues that, for increases in fiscal 
capacity to be beneficial, there must be a concomitant increase in political accountability. He 
refers to this type of outcome as a “consensually strong state.” Also see Acemoglu, “Politics.” 
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budgetary authority through parliament. Since they now controlled how 
tax revenues would be spent, elites could devote a portion of new funds 
to infrastructure investments that they valued. Meanwhile, the ruler 
gained greater revenues for military purposes, as nascent constitutional 
monarchs still exerted significant power over foreign affairs. Indeed, 
Kenneth Schultz and Barry Weingast argue that the ability of liberal 
states to make credible spending commitments offered critical military 
advantages over absolutist ones in European history.13 
 
Key Implications 
 
 Summarizing, we identify five key implications from our framework 
that will guide our analysis: (1) States with high ambitions for territorial 
expansion or that faced high threats of foreign attack spent greater sums 
on the military. (2) States that spent greater military sums had to gather 
larger tax revenues. (3) States borrowed when possible and preferred 
increasing indirect taxes on popular consumption rather than direct taxes 
on elite incomes. (4) Parliamentary regimes gathered larger direct taxes 
than absolutist regimes. (5) Parliamentary regimes spent greater amounts 
on nonmilitary items, and in particular infrastructure, than absolutist 
regimes. 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE RISORGIMENTO 
 
 Figure 1 displays a political map of the Italian peninsula at the end  
of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. Representatives at the Congress of 
Vienna divided the peninsula into five major political units: the Kingdom 
of Sardinia, which despite its official name was constituted mainly of 
Piedmont and Liguria in the northwest (and thus referred to as Piedmont 
from here on); the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia in the northeast; the 
Grand Duchy of Tuscany in the center-north; the Papal States in the 
center-south; and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in the south; and three 
minor ones: the Duchies of Lucca (absorbed by Tuscany in 1847), 
Modena, and Parma in the center-north. The Two Sicilies was the largest 
pre-unitary polity in size and population, followed by Lombardy-Venetia, 
Piedmont, the Papal States, Tuscany, Modena, and Parma. 
 
  
 
13 “Advantage” and “Limited Governments.” Also see Macdonald, Free Nation; Hoffman, 
“Why”; and Cox, “War.” 
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FIGURE 1 
MAP OF PRE-UNITARY ITALY IN 1815 
 
Source: Shepherd, Historical Atlas. 
 
 Rulers in each of these states were absolutists, their power having been 
restored in 1815. The Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia formed part of the 
Austrian Empire. Though officially governed by a viceroy in Milan, this 
figure was not autonomous and behaved in strict accordance with crown 
orders from Vienna. The Grand Duchy of Tuscany and the Duchies of 
Modena and Parma were ruled by branches of the Austrian Habsburg 
dynasty or by local dynasties related to the Habsburgs. Austria thus 
exercised direct or indirect rule over nearly 35 percent of the peninsula’s 
territory and population. As one of the Great Powers of Europe, it was 
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well-poised to defend the status quo political order as established by the 
Congress of Vienna against foreign or domestic threats. 
 Both the pope and the king of the Two Sicilies shared Austria’s 
conservative aims. The pope’s position as the supreme leader of the 
Catholic Church restricted any serious territorial ambitions. His religious 
status also protected the Papal States from foreign invasion, which would 
have prompted an immediate response by the Catholic Great Powers 
Austria and France. Led by a native Bourbon dynasty, the only land 
border of the Two Sicilies was with the Papal States, which for politico-
religious reasons it could not invade. In the words of King Ferdinando I, 
the Two Sicilies was thus situated “between holy water and salt water.”14 
 Strategically located between France and Austria, the Kingdom of 
Sardinia was the sole threat to the traditional political order. Though 
either Great Power could have conquered Piedmont, both preferred a 
small buffer state at their borders, which made attack by one another 
more difficult. Thus, Piedmont did not face any serious external threats 
so long as it accepted the current state of affairs. Tolerating the status 
quo, however, was in stark contrast with the enduring territorial 
ambitions of the House of Savoy, which had ruled Piedmont since the 
tenth century. The Savoys had begun as feudal leaders of a small Alpine 
fiefdom subject to France, which became a dukedom at the start of  
the fourteenth century. Skillfully exploiting rivalries among the Great 
Powers, the Savoys gradually expanded their territory into both the Po 
Valley and Southern France. Piedmont became a kingdom at the end of 
the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714).15 The Savoys were later 
awarded the province of Liguria including Genoa, the most important 
northern Italian port, at the Congress of Vienna. In the following decades, 
the Savoy remained quiet, but their long-standing goal of state expansion 
proved to be critical in the push towards Italian unification from the 
1840s onward. 
 
The Patrioti and Internal Discontent 
 
 Not all Italians supported the absolutist political order that the 
Congress of Vienna had restored.16 The political situation on the 
peninsula after 1815 was thus less settled than it may have appeared. One 
 
 
14 Romeo, Cavour, vol. 2, p. 802. 
15 Storrs, War. 
16 Our account of the Risorgimento is based on Spellanzon and Di Nolfo, Storia del 
Risorgimento; Candeloro, Storia dell’Italia; Romeo, Il Risorgimento and Cavour, volumi 2 e 3; 
and Hearder, Italy. 
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TABLE 1  
INTERNAL CONFLICTS IN PRE-UNITARY ITALY, 1815‒1859 
Period Piedmont 
Lombardy-
Venetia Modena Parma Tuscany
    Papal 
    States
Two 
Sicilies 
1815–1819 None None None None None 1817 (c) 1817 (r) 
 
1820–1824 1821 (i) 1821 (c),  
1822 (c) 
1821 (c) 1821 (c) None None 1820 (i), 
1823 (c) 
 
1825–1829 1821 (i) None None None None 1825 (c),  
1828 (c),  
1829 (c) 
 
1828 (r) 
1830–1834 1833 (c),  
1834 (r) 
None 1831 (i) 1831 (i) None 1831 (i) 1831 (r), 
1832 (c), 
1833 (c) 
 
1835–1839 None 1835 (c) None None 1835 (c) None 1837 (r) 
 
1840–1844 None None None None None 1843 (r),  
1844 (c) 
1841 (r), 
1844 (r) 
 
1845–1849 1848 (i), 
1849 (r) 
1848 (i),  
1849 (r) 
1848 (i) 1848 (i) 1848 (i) 1845 (r),  
1848 (i) 
1847 (r), 
1848 (i) 
 
1850–1854 None 1852 (c),  
1853 (r) 
 
1853 (r) None None 1853 (c) None 
1855–1859 1857 (r) None None None None None 1856 (r), 
1857 (r) 
Conspiracies 1 4 1 1 1 6 3 
Riots 3 2 1 0 0 2 9 
Insurrections 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 
Totals 6 7 4 3 2 10 14 
Note: Internal conflicts include conspiracies (c), riots (r), and insurrections (i). 
Sources: Spellanzon and Di Nolfo, Storia del Risorgimento; Candeloro, Storia dell’Italia; and 
Hearder, Italy. 
 
portion of elites, inspired by the eighteenth-century Enlightenment  
and known as the patrioti, desired the establishment of liberal political 
regimes. The most radical of them nurtured the desire for the political 
unification of the entire peninsula. 
 Starting at the end of the 1810s, the patrioti began to form  
plots against absolutist rulers. Their aim was to overthrow traditional 
authorities through popular revolts supported by urban workers and lower 
military ranks. Table 1, which describes all major instances of domestic 
turmoil during the Risorgimento, indicates that subversive acts came in 
three waves: 1820/21, 1830/31, and 1848. Each wave coincided with 
larger social upheavals throughout Europe. All of these initiatives 
ultimately failed, sometimes due to the intervention of the Austrian 
military. Finally, Table 1 indicates that internal conflicts were most 
severe in the Papal States and the Two Sicilies.  
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Wars of Unification and Political Change 
 
 The 1848 wave of insurrections in Europe was by far the  
most important of the pre-unitary period. The Italian portion of this  
wave, which began in January in the Two Sicilies and Tuscany, had  
by February advanced to Piedmont and the Papal States. In March,  
the wave spread to Lombardy-Venetia after its citizens learned of the 
revolutions in Vienna and Hungary. During these insurrections, patrioti 
leaders pressured pre-unitary rulers throughout the Italian peninsula to 
grant liberal constitutions and participate in a war of independence 
against Austria led by King Carlo Alberto of Piedmont. None of the 
Italian rulers—with the possible exception of Carlo Alberto himself—
were keen on becoming constitutional monarchs or on waging war on 
Austria. As soon as the revolutionary fervor had died down, all pre-
unitary rulers withdrew from the Piedmont-led war alliance and revoked 
their liberal constitutions, returning to absolutist power. Piedmont 
continued the war effort but was badly defeated not once but twice, first 
in July of 1848 and second, following a long armistice, in March of 
1849. 
 In the aftermath of the second defeat, Carlo Alberto abdicated in the 
hope that his successor Vittorio Emanuele II would receive better peace 
terms from Austria. Unlike other pre-unitary rulers, Vittorio Emanuele 
II decided to uphold the liberal constitution, called the Statuto 
Albertino.17 Over the short run, the new king feared that the liberal 
revolt that had erupted in Genoa upon learning of the military loss 
would spread to the rest of Piedmont. In that case, Vittorio Emanuele II 
would be forced to request Austrian troops to repress the insurrection, 
thereby forfeiting any hope of future support by the patrioti for his 
long-run territorial ambitions. We thus claim that the dominant factor in 
the king’s choice to retain the Statuto was his goal of state expansion.18 
 Vittorio Emanuele II’s decision to honor the liberal constitution was a 
turning point in the Risorgimento. Before 1848 the absolutist rule of  
the Savoys along with the institutionalized power of the Catholic 
Church in Piedmont had disturbed many patrioti. By contrast, the new 
constitutional monarchy became a beacon of freedom for liberal exiles 
from other pre-unitary states and a renewed source of optimism for 
political unification. 
  
 
17 The Statuto later became the founding document of the unified Kingdom of Italy. 
18 As described, the domestic threat of social unrest also played a role. Acemoglu and 
Robinson, “Why,” examine the incentive of political elites to make political reform to prevent 
internal upheaval. 
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 The Statuto had far-reaching consequences for Piedmontese political 
institutions. According to its text, the role of parliament was small. The 
king had the power to appoint the prime minister, the upper chamber 
(Senato), and cabinet officials, and wielded great power over foreign 
policy. However, the lower chamber (Camera dei Deputati) was elected 
and had the key right to approve the yearly budget. In the words of 
Douglass North and Barry Weingast, constitutional reform thus 
established the “fiscal supremacy” of the parliament in Piedmont.19 
 Both the king and elites should have benefited from this parliamentary 
bargain. Merchant elites, a group whose economic interests diverged 
from those of the traditional land-owning aristocracy, gained political 
representation for the first time. These elites—most notably Genoese 
merchants—desired investments in transportation infrastructure to foster 
trade with the Po Valley. Parliamentary budgetary authority would  
enable them to devote greater funds to valued public services. Likewise, 
the king would be able to put a portion of the new tax revenues  
generated by parliamentary government towards military purposes 
(including transportation networks, which also had military functions). 
His hopes for future military triumphs over Austria were thus kept alive. 
 During the 1850s parliament’s power relative to the king grew 
steadily.20 Count Camillo di Cavour, who became prime minister in  
1852, was the dominant figure in Piedmontese politics. Recognizing  
that Piedmont alone could not match Austria militarily, Cavour sought 
alliances with France, Piedmont’s northwesterly neighbor, and the United 
Kingdom. To win their favor, he devised Piedmont’s participation in the 
Crimean War (1853‒1856). Cavour’s strategy was a success. Two years 
later, he signed a secret pact with Napoleon III to wage battle against 
Austria. In the summer of 1859, the two allies defeated the Austrian 
military in Lombardy. 
 This victory triggered insurrections in Tuscany and the Papal  
States, the military leader Giuseppe Garibaldi’s conquest of the South, 
and Piedmont’s successful invasion of the Papal States. A new unified 
Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed in March of 1861. Table 2,  
which summarizes all external conflicts related to Italian unification, 
highlights Piedmont’s role as the chief aggressor on the peninsula and 
Austria’s as the main defender of the status quo political order. 
 
 
 
19 “Constitutions,” p. 816.  
20 Flora, “Statuto Albertino”; and Ghisalberti, Storia. 
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TABLE 2  
EXTERNAL CONFLICTS RELATED TO ITALIAN UNIFICATION, 1815–1870 
 Description Outcome 
Italian War of Independence 
(1848) 
Alliance of all pre-unitary states under the 
leadership of Piedmont against Austria 
Won by Austria 
 
Austro-Sardinian War  
(1849) 
 
Instigated by Piedmont against Austria 
 
Won by Austria 
 
Crimean War  
(1853‒1856) 
 
Participation by Piedmont in war of France 
and the United Kingdom against Russia in 
support of Ottomans 
 
Won by Western 
Allies 
 
Austro-Sardinian War  
(1859) 
 
Instigated by Piedmont in alliance with 
France against Austria 
 
Lombardy won by 
Piedmont (but not 
Venetia) 
 
Liberation of the South 
(1860/61) 
 
An initiative of Garibaldi, unofficially 
sanctioned by Piedmont 
 
Two Sicilies won by 
Italy 
 
Invasion of the Papal States 
(1860/61) 
 
Piedmontese military linked up with 
Garibaldi’s soldiers along the Adriatic  
coast 
 
Annexation of Marche 
and Umbria by Italy 
 
Austro-Italian War  
(1866) 
 
Alliance between Italy and Prussia against 
Austria 
 
Venetia won by Italy 
 
Conquest of Rome  
(1870) 
 
Instigated by Italy against Rome during 
Franco-Prussian War (1870/71) 
 
Rome won by Italy 
Source: See Table 1. 
 
EVIDENCE FROM THE PRE-UNITARY DATABASE 
 
Military and Fiscal Prowess 
 
 To support it ambitious strategy, Piedmont maintained a large and 
growing military. Average military personnel as a portion of total 
population in Piedmont was typically one and one-half to two times 
bigger than for any other pre-unitary state, and military size in Piedmont 
increased from roughly 29,000 personnel in the late 1820s to 52,000  
by the late 1850s (Panel A of Table 3). A large military was costly. 
Piedmont’s military expenditures per capita were on average two to four 
times higher than elsewhere, and doubled from 1.88 gold grams in the 
early 1830s to 3.48 on the eve of unification (Panel B).21 Only Austria, a 
Great Power, matched Piedmont in military size as a portion of total 
population, but not in terms of military spending per head.22 
 
21 To facilitate cross-state comparisons, the revenue and expenditure data were converted into 
gold grams. See the Appendix for details. 
22 Military personnel and spending data for Austria are not available at the sub-empire level. 
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TABLE 3 
 MILITARY SIZE AND SPENDING IN PRE-UNITARY ITALY, 1825–1859 
Average Piedmont Austria Modena Parma Tuscany  
 Papal        
States 
  Two       
Sicilies 
Panel A: Military Personnel Per 1,000 Citizens 
 
1825–1829 6.87 8.33       —       — 2.32 3.58 4.41 
1830–1834 7.11 7.69       —       — 2.18 4.21 4.25 
1835–1839 8.15 8.67       —       — 2.07 5.71 4.30 
1840–1844 6.85 10.33 3.98       — 3.99 5.05 4.67 
1845–1849 9.69 9.77 4.30       — 3.85 3.90 5.16 
1850–1855 10.19 13.25 6.72 9.96 6.57 4.67 5.75 
1855–1859 10.34 10.92 7.25 6.37 8.36 3.66 9.36 
1825–1859 8.60 9.46 5.74 7.97 4.08 3.91 5.45 
Panel B: Per Capita Military Spending 
 
1825–1829       — 0.57       —       — 0.67 0.60 0.82 
1830–1834 1.88 0.90 0.72 0.42 0.63 1.09 0.97 
1835–1839 1.88 0.71 0.65 0.41 0.51 1.14 0.76 
1840–1844 1.97 0.67 0.55 0.46 0.59 1.32 1.08 
1845–1849 3.50 1.56 0.80 0.50 0.84 1.37 1.23 
1850–1855 2.22 2.17 0.93 1.25 0.85 1.04 1.68 
1855–1859 3.48 2.88 1.02 1.15 1.10 1.14 1.87 
1825–1859 2.45 1.35 0.75 0.66 0.73 1.11 1.24 
Notes: Expenditure figures are in gold grams. Military personnel and spending data for the 
Austrian Empire are used for Lombardy-Venetia (these data are not available at the sub-empire 
level). 
Source: See the Appendix. 
 
 Low military size and expenditures in other pre-unitary states, by 
contrast, reflected the non-expansionist foreign policies that they 
pursued. However, there were still notable differences in military 
strength. On average the Papal States and the Two Sicilies spent 50 
percent more per head on the military than Tuscany and 80 percent 
more than Modena or Parma. We largely attribute these differences to 
high levels of domestic unrest in the center-south and south. 
 Piedmont supported its large military by levying higher taxes  
than any other pre-unitary state.23 Average tax revenues per head in 
Piedmont were 20 percent larger than in the Papal States and nearly 
three times higher than in Lombardy-Venetia (Panel A of Table 4). Per 
  
 
23 We focus on taxation and spending by central (rather than local) governments for reasons 
of data availability and comparability. Furthermore, central governments were typically 
responsible for military defense and major infrastructure investments. Local governments 
funded basic services like primary education. 
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TABLE 4  
PER CAPITA TAXES IN PRE-UNITARY ITALY, 1825–1859 
Average Piedmont 
Lombardy-
Venetia Modena Parma Tuscany 
Papal 
States 
Two 
Sicilies 
Panel A: Per Capita Total Tax Revenues 
1825–1829 3.75 1.36 — — 3.02 3.86 3.20 
1830–1834 3.78 1.19 2.57 2.40 2.75 3.52 3.28 
1835–1839 4.48 1.38 2.82 2.48 2.84 3.29 2.78 
1840–1844 4.71 1.48 2.78 2.62 3.12 3.97 3.26 
1845–1849 4.62 1.49 2.72 2.09 3.24 3.71 3.08 
1850–1855 5.69 1.65 3.64 2.71 3.77 4.67 3.73 
1855–1859 8.37 2.10 4.51 3.23 4.60 6.39 4.38 
1825–1859 4.96 1.48 3.08 2.57 3.30 4.14 3.36 
Panel B: Per Capita Trade Taxes 
1825–1829 0.88 0.17 — — — 0.64 0.44 
1830–1834 0.84 0.14 0.42 — — 0.59 0.48 
1835–1839 1.08 0.19 0.44 0.61 — 0.48 0.41 
1840–1844 1.18 0.22 0.51 0.61 — 0.62 0.49 
1845–1849 1.05 0.22 0.47 0.50 — 0.59 0.44 
1850–1855 1.02 0.22 0.64 0.62 — 0.69 0.52 
1855–1859 1.12 0.23 0.71 0.65 — 1.06 0.69 
1825–1859 1.02 0.20 0.52 0.59 — 0.66 0.50 
Panel C: Per Capita Indirect Taxes (excluding trade taxes) 
1825–1829 2.10 0.59 — — — 2.39 1.87 
1830–1834 2.17 0.53 1.25 1.47 — 2.00 1.84 
1835–1839 2.56 0.62 1.44 1.03 — 1.96 1.74 
1840–1844 2.72 0.68 1.40 1.12 — 2.37 1.88 
1845–1849 2.77 0.71 1.35 0.88 — 2.13 1.76 
1850–1855 3.57 0.69 1.79 0.99 — 2.93 2.26 
1855–1859 5.65 1.03 2.43 1.32 — 3.99 2.55 
1825–1859 3.00 0.67 1.55 1.13 — 2.50 1.97 
Panel D: Per Capita Direct Taxes 
1825–1829 0.77 0.61 — — 0.58 0.82 0.98 
1830–1834 0.77 0.52 0.90 0.93 0.50 0.94 0.96 
1835–1839 0.84 0.58 0.93 0.96 0.52 0.85 0.79 
1840–1844 0.80 0.58 0.88 0.90 0.50 0.98 0.89 
1845–1849 0.80 0.56 0.89 0.71 0.65 0.99 0.89 
1850–1855 1.10 0.74 1.21 1.10 0.82 1.05 0.95 
1855–1859 1.61 0.83 1.38 1.42 1.01 1.33 1.14 
1825–1859 0.94 0.62 1.01 0.99 0.64 0.99 0.94 
Notes: Tax figures are in gold grams. Tuscan data do not distinguish between trade taxes and 
other indirect taxes. 
Source: See the Appendix. 
 
capita tax revenues in the Papal States were also relatively large due to 
high debt payments on government loans, some of which dated back to 
the period before the French Revolution of 1789. The combination of 
high taxes and high debt service with low spending on the military or 
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infrastructure helps explain the high level of internal conflict in  
the Papal States. Although Lombardy-Venetia was one of the most 
developed parts of the Austrian Empire, it paid just 40 percent of the 
Austrian average in per capita tax revenues.24 We speculate that Vienna 
kept taxation low in its Italian domains to appease local elites,  
who threatened to defect in favor of Piedmont. Finally, tax differences 
between Piedmont and other pre-unitary states grew over time.  
While per capita tax revenues increased by roughly one-third in the 
Two Sicilies, by one-half in Tuscany and Lombardy-Venetia, and by  
two-thirds in the Papal States from the late 1820s to the late 1850s, in 
Piedmont they more than doubled from 3.75 to 8.37 gold grams. 
 Tax differences between Piedmont and other pre-unitary states were 
not because Piedmont was significantly wealthier. There are no data  
on per capita GDP data for the pre-unitary period, but we can obtain 
state-level estimates for 1871 (the earliest available year) by grouping 
regional GDP data according to pre-unitary borders and scaling by 
population.25 These calculations indicate that post-unification GDP 
differences were small. Piedmont, Lombardy-Venetia, Tuscany, and the 
Papal States were 4 to 6 percent richer than average, while the Two 
Sicilies was 10 percent poorer. Furthermore, the GDP for the center-
north as a whole was just 7 percent higher than in the south. According 
to Vittorio Daniele and Paolo Malanima, this gap did not appear until 
the mid-1860s, which implies that GDP per capita did not differ between 
the center-north including Piedmont and the south at the time of 
unification.26 
 Similarly, tax differences between Piedmont and other pre-unitary 
states did not reflect fundamental differences in tax systems. French 
conquest during the Napoleonic Wars from 1803 to 1815 led to  
the establishment of similar fiscal institutions throughout the Italian 
peninsula. Regions like Liguria, Piedmont, and Tuscany were directly 
annexed to France, while others were formally independent but under 
French rule. As was the case throughout much of Europe, the French 
imposed their fiscal code along with other extensive reforms.27 The 
restored Italian rulers abolished many pieces of French legislation after 
 
24 Good and Ma, “Economic Growth”; and Dincecco, “Fiscal Centralization” and 
Political Transformations. 
25 See Brunetti, Felice, and Vecchi, “Redditi”; and SVIMEZ, Secolo. 
26 “Prodotto.” Urbanization rates suggest that Piedmont did not experience an economic 
decline over the pre-unitary period, either. The city of Genoa, Piedmont’s economic hub, grew 
by 68 percent from 1800 to 1861. This rate was similar to Milan (nearly 60 percent) and the 
center-north as a whole (over 40 percent). See Malanina, “Urbanization.” 
27 Dincecco, “Fiscal Centralization” and Political Transformations; and Acemoglu et al., 
“Consequences.” 
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Napoleon’s final defeat, but they retained the French tax system because 
it yielded much greater revenues. A comparison between the island of 
Sicily, which the French did not conquer and which therefore kept its 
traditional fiscal code, and the French-controlled mainland of the Two 
Sicilies illustrates this difference. Despite partial reform in 1806, Sicilian 
tax revenues per capita were only 45 percent of mainland ones through 
the mid-1840s, and only 21 percent from the late 1840s to the eve  
of unification. There was a similar disparity in Piedmont between the 
mainland and the island of Sardinia, where the French-based tax code 
was not extended until the 1850s. 
 The basic features of the French fiscal system remained across Italy 
through unification. Several minor variations in tax codes existed among 
pre-unitary states, but major differences were few. Consistent with our 
analytical framework, over 50 percent of total tax revenues typically 
came from indirect taxes. Consumption taxes on salt and tobacco and 
sales of foodstuffs in urban markets (dazio consumo) provided the largest 
source of indirect revenues. Consumption taxes on business transactions 
affecting middle-class entrepreneurs were also significant. Trade taxes 
were typically imposed on colonial goods and manufactures rather than 
on basic foodstuffs such as grain; only Piedmont taxed wheat through  
the 1840s. Finally, some states gathered revenues from government-
owned land and enterprises (for example, mines), which were often local 
monopolies. 
 Direct taxes typically accounted for 25 percent of revenues (and up to 
40 percent in Lombardy-Venetia). The most important direct tax was a 
flat tax based on land values (imposta fondiaria or prediale). Since land 
ownership was heavily concentrated throughout the peninsula, this tax 
typically affected traditional agrarian elites. Urban merchant elites, by 
contrast, typically escaped direct taxation through the 1850s, when most 
pre-unitary states introduced new direct taxes. Although the imposed 
French tax code was centralized, actual rates on the direct land tax could 
differ even if they were officially uniform. In fact, the amount to be paid 
depended on the taxable rent that the land generated, which in principle 
was to be assessed by government surveyors according to uniform criteria. 
Lombardy pioneered the use of a modern cadastre in the eighteenth 
century. Tuscany, Venetia, and even the Papal States followed suit over 
the first half of the nineteenth century, although with mixed results.28 
Piedmont did not begin its new survey until the 1850s and accomplished 
little by unification. 
  
 
28 Rossi Ragazzi, “Stato Pontificio”; Uggè, “Lombardo-Veneto”; and Del Pane, Finanza 
Toscana. 
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Borrowing and Indirect Taxes 
 
 Though systematic debt data are not available, there is ample evidence 
that rulers took out large loans to meet short-term fiscal needs. King 
Ferdinando I of the Two Sicilies borrowed heavily in 1815/16 to pay for 
expenses related to the Congress of Vienna, including a large bribe to the 
foreign diplomats that had helped him to retain his throne.29 The king  
also took out loans to reimburse the Austrian soldiers who had restored 
him after the 1820 insurrection. Similarly, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 
Leopoldo II, funded the Austrian garrison that secured his political 
position from 1849 to 1855 with a major loan from the Rothschilds.30  
The most compulsive borrower was the pope, since papal budgets were 
typically in deficit. At 1.42 gold grams per head, average debt service for 
the Papal States over the pre-unitary period absorbed roughly one-third of 
annual tax revenues, and was nearly 20 percent higher than in Piedmont, 
over 200 percent higher than in Parma, and 330 percent higher than  
in Modena.31 Piedmont also took out major loans in the 1850s to help  
fund infrastructure projects.32 By 1860 it had accumulated debts equal to 
nearly five times its annual revenues, or roughly half of all of the debts  
of pre-unitary states.33 Political unification arguably saved Piedmont from 
serious financial troubles, which would have rendered its ambitious 
foreign policy impossible. 
 Though differences in tax composition and collection between 
Piedmont and other pre-unitary states were small through most of the  
pre-unitary period, Piedmont still squeezed out greater trade taxes and 
other indirect taxes per head (Panels B and C of Table 4). On average, 
trade taxes were 55 percent larger in Piedmont than in the Papal States 
(the second highest) and five times larger than in Lombardy-Venetia (the 
lowest). Customs revenues in Piedmont even increased during the 1850s, 
when trade was liberalized and only “fiscal” duties on colonial goods were 
kept.34 Meanwhile, other indirect taxes were 15 percent larger in Piedmont 
than in the Papal States, the second highest, and the rest of the ranking 
was similar as before. 
 
  
 
29 Ostuni, Regno delle Due Sicilie. 
30 Manetti, “Civil difesa,” p. 180. 
31 Felisini, Finanze pontifiche. 
32 Berta, “Circuito.” 
33 Corbino, Annali, vol. I, p. 213. This total excluded most of the debts for the Papal States 
and Venetia, but included the Piedmontese loans issued to fund the 1859 war against Austria. 
34 Di Gianfrancesco, “Politica commerciale.” 
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Parliamentary Government, Direct Taxes, and Expenditure Patterns 
 
 At around 0.80 gold grams per head, direct tax levels in absolutist 
Piedmont were roughly similar to those in other pre-unitary states through 
the late 1840s (Panel D of Table 4). However, in 1851—just after the 
establishment of parliamentary government—Piedmont implemented a 
new, non-land direct tax called the richezza mobile.35 This tax, which  
hit salaries derived from nonagricultural occupations and investment 
income, typically affected merchant elites.36 Parliamentary reform was 
thus associated with a substantial increase in per capita direct taxes, which 
doubled to 1.61 gold grams by the late 1850s. Indeed, direct taxes on the 
eve of unification were 15 percent larger in constitutional Piedmont than 
in Modena or Parma (the second highest) and nearly twice as large as in 
Lombardy-Venetia (the lowest). 
 Furthermore, the political change that granted parliamentary budgetary 
authority to elites coincided with a dramatic increase in nonmilitary 
expenditures in Piedmont. Though Piedmont borrowed and spent heavily 
to cover its participation in the Crimean War (1855/56), peacetime 
military expenditures remained at the levels of previous decades (Figure 
2). Nonmilitary expenditures, by contrast, jumped from roughly 2 to 
between 6 and 8 gold grams per head over the 1850s. The most notable 
feature was the increase in infrastructure investment. Through the early 
1840s, average annual spending on infrastructure in Piedmont was  
less than 0.20 gold grams per capita, just more than in the Papal States and 
less than in Modena or Parma. Over the next 15 years, however, 
infrastructure expenditures in Piedmont grew fivefold to more than 1 gold 
gram.  
 Railways were arguably the most important sort of infrastructure that 
liberal nineteenth-century governments provided.37 The majority of 
infrastructure funds in Piedmont were put towards the construction of  
a comprehensive railway network, which by 1859 amounted to 850 
kilometers, or roughly half of the total for the entire peninsula. By 
investing in railways, moreover, Piedmont compensated for a historical 
deficiency in roadways.38 At 522 total kilometers, the second-largest 
railway network on the eve of unification belonged to Lombardy-Venetia.  
 
35 Romeo, Cavour, volumi 2 e 3; and Marongiu, Storia del fisco. 
36 Indeed, the share of the land tax in direct taxes fell from more than 90 percent through the 
start of the 1850s to roughly 70 percent. 
37 See Cardoso and Lains, Paying. 
38 Di Gianfrancesco, “Politica Commerciale,” p. 60. 
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FIGURE 2 
PER CAPITA MILITARY AND NONMILITARY EXPENDITURES, PIEDMONT, 1830–1859 
 
Source: See the Appendix. 
 
Roughly 20 percent of Austria’s railway system in the 1850s was 
located there, although Lombardy-Venetia comprised just 14 percent  
of the empire’s total population. These railways were necessary to 
transport soldiers in case of domestic revolts or invasion by Piedmont. 
Furthermore, we speculate that the large railway network was, like low 
taxes, another type of economic perk to appease local elites. The pope, 
by contrast, invested little in infrastructure.39 By 1859 there were only 
101 total railway kilometers in the Papal States. Similarly, the lack of a 
comprehensive railway network in the south reflected its conservative 
approach. The Two Sicilies possessed just 99 total railway kilometers 
on the eve of unification. 
 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
 Regression analysis is a concise way to quantify the magnitudes of  
key relationships—as summarized by the five implications of our analytic 
framework—after controlling for confounding factors. Our regression 
method is ordinary least squares (OLS) with first-order autoregression-
robust standard errors.40 We include state-fixed effects to capture constant 
  
 
39 Also see Friz, “Strade.” 
40 The test derived by Wooldridge, Econometric Analysis, and implemented by Drukker, 
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TABLE 5  
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EXTERNAL CONFLICTS AND MILITARY SPENDING IN 
PRE-UNITARY ITALY, 1825–1859 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable is Per Capita Military Expenditures 
 
External conflicts 
 
3.48*** 
(0.76) 
1.79*** 
(0.51) 
1.28** 
(0.57) 
1.27** 
(0.54) 
Internal conflicts 
 
   0.42 
(0.48) 
     
State-fixed effects      No      Yes      Yes      Yes 
Time-fixed effects      No      No      Yes      Yes 
Observations 39 39 39 39 
R-squared 0.45 0.80 0.88 0.89 
**indicates significance at the 5 percent level. 
***indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
Notes: Data use five-year averages. Expenditure figures are in gold grams. External (internal) 
conflict variable measures the share of years per five-year period that states participated  
in external (internal) wars according to Table 2 (Table 1). Estimation is by OLS with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
Source: See the Appendix. 
 
but unmeasured features of pre-unitary polities such as geography, size, 
and culture, and time-fixed effects to account for Italy- and Europe-
wide shocks. 
 The first implication of our analytic framework relates external 
threats to military spending. To measure warfare, we use the share  
of years per five-year period that states participated in external wars. 
The results in Table 5 indicate that wartime was associated with 
significantly larger levels of per capita military expenditures than 
peacetime, even after controlling for state-fixed effects (columns 2  
to 4), time-fixed effects (columns 3 and 4), and internal conflicts 
(column 4). Participating in the most external conflicts (0.60 for 
Piedmont for the 1855‒1859 period) versus nonparticipation increased 
military spending by 0.76 to 2.09 gold grams per head per five-year 
period. Internal conflicts had a negligible effect. 
   
 
“Testing,” indicates serial correlation for many of our panel data specifications. Note that the 
regression results are robust to many alternative methods: OLS with Newey-West-robust standard 
errors, panel-corrected standard errors (plus an AR1 term), Driscoll-Kraay-robust standard errors, 
and feasible generalized least squares (plus an AR1 term). See Hoechle, “Robust Standard Errors,” 
for an overview of these methods. We use OLS with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
when there is no serial correlation. 
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TABLE 6  
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR MILITARY SPENDING AND TAXES IN PRE-UNITARY 
ITALY, 1825–1859 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Dependent Variable is Per Capita Tax Revenues 
 
Per capita military expenditures 1.00*** 
(0.23) 
0.81*** 
(0.31) 
0.31 
(0.22) 
0.98*** 
(0.31) 
     
State-fixed effects 
 
     No     Yes     Yes Yes 
Time-fixed effects      No      No     Yes Yes, 
excluding 
1845–1849 
Observations 39 39 39 33 
R-squared 0.56 0.63 0.89 0.87 
Panel B: Dependent Variable is Per Capita Indirect Taxes 
 
Per capita military expenditures 0.81*** 
(0.21) 
0.60** 
(0.25) 
0.22 
(0.19) 
0.77*** 
(0.28) 
     
State-fixed effects 
 
     No      Yes     Yes      Yes 
Time-fixed effects      No      No     Yes Yes, 
excluding 
1845–1849 
Observations 39 39 39 33 
R-squared 0.56 0.69 0.89 0.87 
**indicates significance at the 5 percent level. 
***indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
Notes: Data use five-year averages. Expenditure and tax figures are in gold grams. Estimation is 
by OLS with first-order autoregression-robust standard errors. 
Source: See the Appendix. 
 
 The second and third implications of our analytic framework relate 
the demand for military spending to tax policy, and in particular  
to indirect taxes which typically affected the population masses. The 
results in column 1 of Panel A of Table 6 indicate that greater per capita  
military spending was associated with significantly larger levels of total 
tax revenues per capita. The corresponding results in Panel B indicate 
that the same was true for per capita indirect taxes including trade  
taxes. These findings also held after controlling for state-fixed effects 
(column 2). Although these effects remained positive once time-fixed 
effects were included as in column 3, they were notably smaller  
and statistically insignificant. The tumultuous period from 1845 to 
1849, when military expenditures shot up and tax collection systems 
temporarily collapsed, drives this result. Indeed, when the 1845–1849 
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period is left out as in column 4, the significant positive relationship 
between military spending and tax policy is restored even after 
controlling for time-fixed effects. For columns 1, 2, and 4, a one gold 
gram increase in per capita military expenditures was matched by an 
increase in per capita total tax revenues of 0.81 to 1.00 gold grams per 
five-year period. 
 The final two implications of our analytic framework relate 
parliamentary regimes to direct taxes and spending on nonmilitary  
items such as infrastructure. To measure parliamentary government, we 
use the share of years per five-year period that pre-unitary states  
had liberal constitutions. This coding captures the parliamentary regime 
in Piedmont from 1848 onward, since the constitutions that were 
established elsewhere during the 1848 insurrections were too short- 
lived to have had notable budgetary effects. Since the provision of 
railways was a hallmark of nineteenth-century liberal governments, we 
use cumulative railway kilometers as our measure of infrastructure. 
 The results in Panel A of Table 7 indicate that the establishment of a 
parliamentary regime was associated with a significant increase in per 
capita direct taxes of 0.27 to 0.53 gold grams per five-year period 
relative to absolutist regimes. Similarly, having a parliamentary regime 
was associated with a significant increase in nonmilitary expenditures 
of 2.86 to 3.92 gold grams per capita (Panel B), and a significant 
increase in cumulative railway kilometers of 267 to 411 kilometers 
(Panel C). These findings also held after controlling for fixed effects by 
state (columns 2 and 3) and time (column 3). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Pre-unitary states during the Italian Risorgimento pursued different 
military, fiscal, and political policies in response to diverse external and 
internal threat environments. Low threats of invasion and high domestic 
turmoil led the Papal States, Tuscany, and the Two Sicilies to pursue 
conservative overall policies. While Lombardy-Venetia and Piedmont 
took more ambitious military and fiscal approaches, there was a critical 
difference between these two polities. The key goal of Austria and  
thus of Lombardy-Venetia was to defend the status quo political order 
in Europe. After military defeats at the hands of Austria in 1848/49, 
however, Piedmont adopted a new expansionist strategy that included 
parliamentary change and large infrastructure investments. 
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TABLE 7 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR PARLIAMENTARY REGIMES AND FINANCES IN PRE-
UNITARY ITALY, 1825‒1859 
       (1)       (2)       (3) 
Panel A: Dependent Variable is Per Capita Direct Taxes 
 
Parliamentary regime 
 
0.49*** 
(0.18) 
0.53*** 
(0.20) 
0.27*** 
(0.09) 
    
State-fixed effects      No     Yes     Yes 
Time-fixed effects      No     No     Yes 
Observations 47 47 47 
R-squared 0.15 0.56 0.91 
Panel B: Dependent Variable is Per Capita Nonmilitary Expenditures 
 
Parliamentary regime 
 
3.70*** 
(0.71) 
3.92*** 
(0.79) 
2.86*** 
(0.50) 
    
State-fixed effects      No     Yes     Yes 
Time-fixed effects      No     No     Yes 
Observations 39 39 39 
R-squared 0.51 0.67 0.91 
Panel C: Dependent Variable is Cumulative Railway Kilometers 
 
Parliamentary regime 
 
383*** 
(111) 
411*** 
 (132) 
267** 
(114) 
    
State-fixed effects     No    Yes    Yes 
Time-fixed effects     No    No    Yes 
Observations 35 35 35 
R-squared 0.34 0.44 0.73 
**indicates significance at the 5 percent level. 
***indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
Notes: Data use five-year averages. Tax and expenditure figures are in gold grams. 
Parliamentary regime variable measures the share of years per five-year period that states had 
liberal constitutions (that is, Piedmont from 1848 onward). Estimation is by OLS with first-
order autoregression-robust standard errors. 
Source: See the Appendix. 
 
 The results of our analytic narrative are consistent with the thrust of 
the new theoretical literature described in the introduction. Yet they also 
raise several counterfactual questions. For instance, what if Piedmont 
had not had a long history of territorial expansion or had not been 
strategically situated as a buffer between France and Austria? What if 
the Two Sicilies had not been positioned between “holy water and salt 
water?” How did Piedmont’s medium size influence its willingness to 
strike a parliamentary bargain, as well as its effectiveness? Would such 
a deal have made a difference in a state as small as Modena or Parma? 
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These hypothetical scenarios suggest that idiosyncratic factors such  
as ambition, geography, and size have important effects on policy 
outcomes that future theoretical models should incorporate. 
 Finally, the case of Piedmont indicates that military imperatives had 
key impacts on nascent democracy and economic development. Our 
results, however, do not imply that warfare always has positive effects. If 
the Congress of Vienna had not granted the Savoys the key port of Genoa 
in 1815, then the merchant class in Piedmont would have been much 
smaller, and there may not have been the impetus for later parliamentary 
reform. The growing clout of the merchant class generally, moreover, 
was related to the Industrial Revolution in continental Europe. The broad 
historical juncture was thus of fundamental importance for the ways in 
which the Risorgimento took shape. Future work that examines the links 
between military, fiscal, and political policies in other contexts would 
prove useful to compare and contrast with the Italian case. 
 
Appendix 
 
 
 The database is downloadable from the website, http://sites.google.com/site/mdincecco/. 
Data for Lucca are not available. 
 
Tax Revenues  
 
 Total tax revenues are the sum of direct taxes (typically, dative reali, personale, 
prediale, and altre) and indirect taxes on trade (typically, dogane), consumption 
(typically, dazi consumo, sale, and tabacchi), and transfers (typically, bollo, tasse 
affairi, trasferimenti, and altre). They exclude income from state properties. Michael 
Pammer provided the tax data for Lombardy and Venetia. Totals for Lombardy-
Venetia sum each series. Data for the Papal States are from Felisini, Finanze 
pontificie. Data are from Romani, Storia economica, for Parma (table 19), Modena 
(table 20), and Tuscany (table 21). Data for the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont are 
from Felloni, “Stati Sabaudi,” and sum total tax revenues for the mainland and 
Sardinia. Data for the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies are from Ostuni, Regno delle Due 
Sicilie (appendix v, table 1) and sum total tax revenues for the mainland and Sicily. 
 To facilitate cross-state comparisons, the tax revenue data were converted into gold 
grams as follows. First, tax revenues in home currencies were converted into Austrian 
lire. Second, tax revenues in Austrian lire were converted into real 1861 prices using 
the price indices for Northern and Southern Italy from Malanima, “Age” (appendix 1). 
Third, real tax revenues in Austrian lire were converted into British pounds. Fourth, 
tax revenues in British pounds were converted into gold troy ounces using the series 
from Officer, “Price.” Fifth, tax revenues in gold troy ounces were converted into 
revenues in gold grams by multiplying by 31.10. The exchange rate data for the first 
and third steps are from Federico, “Invasion.”  
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Population 
 
 Pammer provided the population data for Lombardy and Venetia. Totals for 
Lombardy-Venetia sum each series. Data for Parma, Modena, the Kingdom of the 
Two Sicilies, and Tuscany are from Romani, Storia economica (table 1). Data for the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies sum the populations for the mainland and Sicily. Due to 
availability, data for the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont and the Papal States are from 
SVIMEZ, Secolo. Data for the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont sum the populations for 
the mainland and Sardinia. In all cases, population data between census years were 
linearly interpolated. 
 
Military Personnel and Expenditures 
 
 Pammer provided the military expenditure data for Austria. Military and total 
expenditure data for the Papal States are from Felisini, Finanze pontificie. Military 
expenditures sum esercito, truppe straniere, and polizia. Data are from Romani, Storia 
economica, for Parma (table 19, oneri per la difesa), and Modena (table 20, oneri per 
la difesa). Data for the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont are from Felloni, “Stati 
Sabaudi,” and sum military and total expenditures for the mainland and Sardinia.  
Data for Tuscany are from Manetti, “Civil difesa” (tables 3, 6, and 14). Data for the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies are from Ostuni, Regno delle Due Sicilie (appendix v, 
table 2) and sum military (polizia, guerra, and marina) and total expenditures for the 
mainland and Sicily. Expenditures were converted into gold grams following the 
methodology described above. 
 Nonmilitary expenditures were computed as the differences between total and 
military expenditures.  
 The military personnel data are from Singer, “Reconstructing.”41 The variable name 
is “milpop.”42 
 
Urbanization 
 
 Paolo Malanima provided the urbanization data for Italian cities in 1800 and 1861. 
 
Railways  
 
 The railway data for pre-unitary Italian states are from Romani, Storia economica 
(table 25). Data for Austria are from Mitchell, International Historical Statistics. 
 
 
  
 
 
41 These data were downloaded from the Correlates of War website, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 
42 For consistency, total population figures (variable name “tpop”) from this source were used 
to calculate military personnel per thousand citizens. However, other per capita figures used the 
population data described above. 
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